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ABSTRACT: Observational Method (OM) was studied based upon a case history of failed geotechnical exca-
vation in Singapore. Several items including inclinometer provide vital information on the safety of the ge-
otechnical construction sites. Engineer who is specialized in OM, adequate knowledge of geotechnical engi-
neering as well as instrumentation, should be engaged during the design and construction phase. An ISO 
standardization is necessary to provide a basic process to implement OM. 
1 INTRODUCTON 
Observational Method was proposed by Terzaghi 
and Peck (1967) for several reasons including to 
confirm the assumed geotechnical condition during 
design stage as well as to avoid critical situation in 



















Fig.1 General Plan view 
One of the failed cases in Singapore that has been 
described by Prof.Ishihara (2011) during the 
TC302 Osaka Symposium is discussed in term of 
Observational Method.  
After the collapse of Nicoll Highway on 20 April 
2004, a Committee of Inquiry was established 






































































Fig.3 Design of Cut and Cover of Type M3 
  
COI reported their conclusion on 13 May 2005 to 
the Minister of Manpower, Government of Singa-
pore, who also released the report to the pub-
lic(COI report, 2005). 
The COI report concludes the accident was associ-
ated with two inadequate designs of “effective 
method of analysis for cut and cover excavation” 

















































This paper will show the results of monitoring and 
how the process to the failure could be traced. 
 
 
2 CUT AND COVER SECTION OF M3 ZONE 
 
As shown in Fig.1, the section is parallel to the ex-
isting Nicoll Highway on the ground surface and 
consists of different types of retaining wall includ-
ing M2 and M3 that failed as shown in Fig.1. 
As shown in Fig.3, the special design was two sets 
of Grout slabs that had been installed before the 




excavation started. The depth of the excavation 
was planned to GL-34.5 
m above the lower grout slab. 
The cone penetration resistance shown in Fig.3 
shows very soft soil down to 35m from the surface 
where stiff clayey soil continues. 
3 INSTRUMENTATION 
The site was rather well instrumented to monitor 
settlement, pore water pressure, strut strain, as well 
as inclination along diaphragm wall as shown in 
Fig.4. Settlement was to monitor the ground where 
Nicoll Highway passes north of the excavation site 
nearby. Decrease of pore water pressure that would 
cause consolidation settlement of the foundation of 
the Nicoll Highway was also monitored. 
Inclinometer monitoring points at I-65 and I-104 
were installed along the diaphragm wall where the 
electric cable of 66kVolt had been installed and the 
diaphragm walls were missing at the sections 
where the cable cross over the wall lines.   
4 INCLINOMETER  
The inclinometer guide pipes were installed at I-65 




























Fig.4 Instrumentation at the failed site 
 
Excavation started on 26 September, 2003, at the 
M3 Section. The monitored wall deflections from 
the six strut installation until before the failure took 
place are shown in Fig.5 as well as chronological 
time change of excavation with strut and the max-
imum deflection for I-65 and I-104 in Fig.6.   
The allowable deflection could be estimated by 
mechanical properties of such related materials as 
diaphragm wall, soils to be excavated, and jet grout 
pile. 
When the excavation starts, the soil inside the ex-
cavated zone are under the increase of horizontal 
stressed with vertical stress decreased. Due to the 
stress change caused by excavation, the soil ground 
becomes horizontally stressed with some critical 
failure strains.  
The width of the excavation was 19.85m.  
 
Table-1 Horizontal strain in soil and JGP 
 





















































































































































































Fig.6 Change of Max. deflections with time  
 
As shown in Fig.5 and Fig.6, the deflection after 
the sixth strut installation, the total deflection had 



















Fig.7 Stress-strain for JGP (Imamura et al.(2008)) 
 
Fig.7 shows basic stress and strain for horizontally 
loaded JGP obtained by laboratory tests (Imamura 
et al., 2008). The vertical stress was normalized by 
dividing horizontal stress by the unconfined com-
pression strength of column of JGP (500kPa).    
Fig.7 shows the maximum allowable horizontal 
strain is estimated as 2%. 
 
If safety margin is given as FS=2, the allowable 
deflection at the level of JGP is 1%, which is 20cm 























































Fig.8 Wall deflection monitored after the sixth strut 
 
As shown in Fig.8, the deflection at the level the 
upper JGP slab had reached 12cm for southern and 
8cm for the northern side wall. 
 




























































































































If OM should be applied, this could be the one of the 
critical phase when some countermeasures should be 
considered. The possible countermeasures include 
additional soil improvement in the zone above the 
upper JGP slab and/or additional strut installation to 
strengthen the temporary retaining structure. 
At this stage, different response of the wall deflec-
tions for north and south sides should have been 
noticed. The lower JGP was observed to have 
moved into center with about 5cm for southern 
side but no displacement for northern side. 
When the strut 8 was completed, the displacement 
for southern wall had increased to 35cm (25cm for 
southern and 10cm for the northern wall) at the 
upper JGP slab, which was 1.8% almost in failure.  
The asymmetry of the wall deflection for north and 
south sides was increased with the excavation 
steps.  
When the excavation reached at the upper JGP, the 
asymmetry became clear and the reason to have 
caused the phenomena might well be studied. The 
reason could be any difference of water pressure or 
earth pressure against for north and south walls.  
Many settlement points were installed along the re-

































Fig.11 Settlement vs. Deflection 
5 SETTLEMENT AND PORE PRESSURE  
The Nicoll Highway is the nearby structure that 
should not be affected.  
monitoring had been installed for the evaluation. 
Pore water measurements had been also installed 
near the retaining wall as shown in Fig.9. One of 
the typical settlement installed at L111 was shown 
in Fig.10. The level of the ground surface was 
GL=+102.9m RL.  
Fig.11 shows a comparison between the max de-
flection at I-65 and settlement at L-111 with the 
same time scale.  
The pore water pressure was monitored at two 
depths at GL-17.5m and -30.5m of behind the dia-
phragm wall. The ground water was observed GL-
2m in general in the area. 
The ground settlement at L111 was gradually had 
taken place and reached about 10cm in January 
2004. After this point, the settlement had increased 
rather rapidly with time. 
The porepressure at GL-17.5m had gradually de-
creased with excavation stage.  
 



































































Fig.12 Max. Deflection at I-65 vs. Settlement at L-
111 
 
The decrease of the pore water pressure might be 
caused by inwards movement of the diaphragm 
wall that had resulted in volume expansion of the 
soil behind the wall. 
The settlement at L111 was caused either by con-
solidation or displacement of diaphragm wall. 
 
Since the settlement was increased so fast, the set-
tlement was very likely considered by the move-
ment of diaphragm movement. 
6 SETTLEMENT AND MAX DEFLECTION 
The max deflection at I-65 that is shown in Fig.6 
shows its max deflection at the excavation stage af-
ter the sixth strut installation. After this point, the 
maximum deflection was decreased, which implies 
the diagram wall of the north side was moving 
backwards.   
Fig.12 shows the relationship between the settle-
ment and the maximum deflection. Until March 1, 
2004, the settlement at L-111 is almost the same 
amount of the max. deflection at I-65. The direct 
relation of the settlement of the surface ground 
with the max. deflection means that the settlement 
is not caused by consolidation but the compensa-
tion of the soil volume caused by the retaining 
wall. After March 1, the settlement was continued 
to increase. On the other hand, the deflection had 

































The backwards movement of the diaphragm wall is 
not easy to understand. This might be caused by 
the displacement assumption for the inclination 
calculation. It is a common practice to assume the 
bottom point of the inclinometer guide pipe that is 
embedded within rather dense sand or hard clayey 
layer is assumed as a fixed point. It is rather realis-
tic to consider the bottom of the inclination guide 
pipe had moved. Fig.11 shows the estimated in-
crease of the deflection assuming the linear rela-
tionship between the settlements at L-111 and the 
max deflection at I-65 as in Fig.12, which resulted 
in about 28cm.. 
7 LESSONS LEARNT 
The author had selected several topics from the 
failure of excavation in Singapore that happened 
on 20 April 2004 from the view points of OM as 
well as instrumentation, which was not referred in 
the report of Committee of Investigation. 
 
7.1 General Review of Applicability of 
Observational Method in the Failure  
Among many monitoring items, displacement is 
much clear than stress or force. If the failure strains 
are known before the construction starts, displace-
ment criteria to avoid failure of different materials 
might well be established. In the case under dis-
cussion, allowable horizontal displacement for jet 
grout pile slab was discussed.  
 




7.2 Necessity of specialized OM Engineer for 
geoconstruction 
If OM should be applied to a any geotechnical construc-
tion, it is not easy to implement the process without a 
good quality of geo-engineer who is basically geotech-
nical engineer and yet has a profound knowledge on the 
instrumentation. The author believes that independent 
professional field of “OM and Instrumentation in Ge-
otechnical Engineering” must be separated from the 
common geotechnical engineering and authorizing sys-
tem should be established to select and to give the sta-
tus. It is also necessary legal enforcement to include the 
engineer who hold the status of OM and Instrumentation 
in Geotechnical Engineering. 
7.3 Measurement of Displacement of Top of 
Guide Pipes for Inclinometer Measurement  
In most geotechnical construction sites, the inclinations 
are measured using guide pipes and reference point is 
selected at the bottom of the pipe. 
However, in an excavation site, excavation depth ap-
proached to final level, the overburden pressure de-
creases and becomes much easier for bottom of the 
guide pipe to be displaced than you might consider. 
To avoid any misguided result, the displacement of the 
top of the guide pipe should always be monitored when 
the inclinometers are measured. 
.GPS is a good system for automatic monitoring instead 
of manual survey when the OM should be applied in ra-
ther long period. 
7.4 Interpretation of Geotechnical Behavior 
based upon related Monitored Data 
It is important to discuss settlement data with deflection 
of the nearby retaining wall. The relationship among 
various monitored items provides important and vital in-
formation to understand the site conditions. 
7.5 Effective or/and Total Stress ? 
The traditional soil mechanics assumes and discuss fail-
ure in terms of stress. Since the characteristics of soil 
changes with various factors and conditions, some sim-
plification was necessary to obtain some conclusion. 
One of the unique condition to be considered in soil me-
chanics is “drained” or “undrained.” 
When stress path that is expected for construction pro-
cess is known, the soil specimen may be tested to along 
the stress path to obtain strength parameters for “Total 
Stress” approach. 
When pore pressure is monitored during the test, “Ef-
fective Stress” approach may also be available. Addi-
tional information of the pore pressure that is generated 
during the shearing process due to dilatancy is vital for 
the Effective Stress approach. 
Discussion of total or effective stress is for only design 
stage. In the design stage, various conditions are as-
sumed as safer side. When the construction site allows 
“undrained condition,” the total stress approach may 
still be applied during the construction to discuss the 
safety in terms of stress level. 
Since the deformation parameters of soil generally de-
pend upon such factors of effective confining pressure, 
stress path, and other several factors, effective stress ap-
proach will give much easier to deal with deformation 
analysis than total stress approach. 
7.6 ISO Standardization for OM in geotechnical 
engineering 
In early stage of soil mechanics, big projects are not so 
many and such giants like Terzaghi and Peck could 
work by themselves. At present, it becomes rather 
common to implement huge geotechnical construction.  
Most failed cases are without monitoring instrumenta-
tion or lack of knowledge of how to interpret the moni-
tored data even though instrumented. 
We need to create the standard of basic principles of in-
strumentation and how to implement OM in geotech-
nical construction as one of ISO in geotechnical engi-
neering. 
It is necessary to have 5 member countries of ISO to 
make such a new item.  
8 CONCLUSION 
The failure of the failed excavation work in Singapore 
20 April 2004 is reviewed in terms of instrumentation 
and OM. 
Conclusions are obtained as follows, 
 
1. Observational Method provides the basic approach to 
complete geotechnical construction with safety. 
2. It is necessary to provide a special geotechnical engi-
neer who understands not only geotechnical engi-
neering but also instrumentation and observational 
method. 
3. It is also pointed out such key information of dis-
placement of top of guide pipe for inclinometer 
should be prepared. 
4. ISO standardization for OM is highly recommended. 
5. Effective and Total stress approach should be dis-
cussed for not only obtaining safety of the project 
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